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CHAPTER 3 
THE LOGIC OF SUSTAINABILITY LABELS: THEIR FUNCTIONS FOR 
STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR ROLE IN MARKETS 
Joop de Boer and Onno Kuik 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapteri examines the role of labelling and certification schemes in the 
pursuit of making production and consumption processes more sustainable. This role 
can be seen in two ways, namely as a political force and as an economic instrument. 
In terms of political forces, labelling refers to the view that people should be enabled 
to make morally or ecologically motivated choices and take sides in political 
conflicts. As an economic instrument, labelling aims to affect the behaviour of 
market participants by disclosing information about products that is not directly 
observable to the buyer. In the following sections both roles are discussed. 
Generally, labelling and certification schemes are closely connected with the 
rise of commercial economies in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Labels in the 
form of trademarks and brand names are part of a rich tradition of practices that 
sellers have developed to assure buyers of the authenticity of their products or 
services. In the past, many of these practices have given rise to governmental 
regulations to prevent misleading claims. ii  Mainly in response to the increasing 
importance of international trade and multinational supply chains, much work has 
been done in the last decades to standardise quality control and quality assurance 
with regard to issues as technical reliability, safety and sanitation. In this context, 
environmental and social labelling schemes are relatively new and that applies even 
more to sustainability labelling in general. By their nature, these schemes refer to 
qualities of products, production processes or services that are not only relevant from 
a private perspective, such as human health issues, but also from a public 
perspective, such as issues of biodiversity and social justice. These qualities are 
neglected by the conventional labelling schemes, but are increasingly recognized by 
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all kinds of actors in the marketplace. iii  Apparently, there is a need for more 
comprehensive labelling and certification schemes that are still compatible with a 
free-market approach. However, the fact that the qualities in question are relatively 
new and involve both private and public concerns may preclude their smooth 
incorporation into the conventional quality assurance systems. 
The following sections combine a logical analysis of labels with a 
behavioural analysis of their functions for stakeholders and their impacts on markets. 
Section 3.2 starts by specifying how information on issues of sustainability can be 
analysed as a claim put forward by sellers to inform buyers. This analysis is 
elaborated in Section 3.3, which discusses what labelling means from the perspective 
of the main stakeholders (i.e., companies, consumers, policy makers, NGOs). Based 
on insights derived from the study of information economics, Section 3.4 shows that 
disclosure of information through labelling can lead to various market strategies and 
interactions among market participants that may not always lead to the desired 
outcome in terms of the objective of the label. Finally, Section 3.5 draws together 
these discussions and emphasises that it is important to examine the conditions under 
which sustainability labels can be successful or can lead to unwanted or "perverse" 
effects. 
 
3.2 Labels as claims 
Given the choice of sustainability issues that are relevant for a category of 
products or services, the label is a claim that a particular product or service complies 
with the corresponding standards. In fact, even the instrument of labelling itself is a 
claim, as it refers to certain characteristics of the procedure under which the label is 
awarded. One of the ways to get a better understanding of such claims is to consider 
them from the perspective of logical theory. From this perspective, a claim is 
essentially a conclusion whose merits can be established by analysing the arguments 
on which it is based. Since the arguments will differ, depending on the content of the 
claim, it is the analysis of their layout or structure that counts. 
A general framework for the analysis of arguments has been developed by the 
British philosopher Stephen Toulmin,iv who took the discipline of jurisprudence as a 
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starting point to elaborate logical theory in a practical way. Many arguments fit the 
structure shown in Figure 3.1. This figure presents the set of statements that provide 
the rationale or plausibilityv for arguing that certain data (D) imply a claim (C). The 
plausibility of the relationship between data and claim is based on warrants (W), 
which are supported by backings (B). In contrast, its plausibility can be challenged 
by rebuttals (R). The next two examples illustrate how this particular layout can be 
used. 
 
PLAUSIBILITYDATA (D)Sustainability labelling
discloses certain
features of a product
or production process
WARRANTS (W)
Any disclosed feature
that informed buyers
are willing to pay for
is a quality of that
product 
BACKING (B)
Several studies have
shown that a number
of buyers are willing
to pay extra for a more
sustainable product
CLAIM (C)
Sustainability labelling
is a kind of quality
assurance in the
marketplace
REBUTTALS (R)
Unless the message of
sustainability is too
complicated
Unless labelling causes
unwanted side-effects
that turn into negative
qualities 
 
Figure 3.1 The elements of Toulmin’s theory of arguments with an example of their use5. 
The first example is the claim that "Sustainability labelling is a kind of 
quality assurance in the marketplace." In this case the datum is in the form of a 
description, namely "Sustainability labelling discloses certain features of a product 
or production process." In this description we chose the term "disclosure" because 
labelling will reveal differences between more sustainable and less sustainable 
practices, which buyers might have been aware of but which they could not identify 
in the market. Next, warrants or bridge-like statements are used to connect the datum 
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with the claim. In this example, the warrant is taken from the field of economicsvi 
and it can be stated as follows. Buyers will see a feature that is in their interests as a 
quality of the product. A relevant feature for buyers who are informed of certain 
unacceptable practices is the fact that a product comes from resources managed in a 
socially and environmentally acceptable manner. These buyers' interest in better 
management becomes clear from their willingness to pay for it. In short, the warrant 
is "Any disclosed feature that informed buyers are willing to pay for is a quality of 
that product." So, almost certainly, "Sustainability labelling is a kind of quality 
assurance." 
As the warrants may not convince anyone who challenges the claim, there 
will normally be other logical arguments and assurances, without which the warrants 
themselves would possess no authority. This support comes in the form of backings, 
which represent some evident truths or categorical statements of fact, including the 
relevant sections in the books of law or the scientific literature. In the present 
example, the backing refers to the field of economics: "Several studies have shown 
that at least a number of buyers are willing to pay extra for a product that has been 
created in a more sustainable manner".vii As a counterforce to the backing, however, 
there is always an opportunity for rebuttal, indicating circumstances in which the 
general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside. Rebuttals to the present 
argument are that the message of sustainability is often too complicated for a 
straightforward quality disclosure and that labelling causes unwanted side-effects in 
the market, which will turn into negative qualities sooner or later (e.g., accusations of 
unfair trading). These rebuttals can lead to a qualified conclusion, such as 
"Sustainability labelling is a kind of quality assurance in the marketplace, unless its 
organisers have disregarded the rules of good communication and fair competition." 
The above is not very specific about the nature of sustainability labelling. A 
major difference with other quality assurance systems is that sustainability refers not 
only to private but also to public concerns. How can a private party claim that these 
concerns are addressed in an appropriate way? Focussing on a hypothetical 
sustainability label the layout of arguments in the second example might be as 
follows (e.g., Figure 3.2). 
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In support of the claim that a certain product has been created in a sustainable 
manner, its producer can appeal to the datum that a special label has been attributed 
to it, bundling information about the production process. The warrant is that 
producers who use such a label do comply with a set of standards for sustainable 
production processes. Since, however, questions of sustainability are always subject 
to qualifications and conditions, the conclusion may be rebutted, for example, 
because the production process is only relatively more sustainable than others and 
complies only with current standards for sustainability. 
 
PLAUSIBILITYDATA (D)Attached to this product
is a label that bundles
information on the way
in which it was created
WARRANTS (W)
Producers who use such
a label do comply
with a set of standards
for sustainable
production processes
BACKINGS (B)
The sustainability
standards have been
endorsed by one or
more relevant and
independent parties
= recognition
CLAIM (C)
This product
was created in a
sustainable manner
REBUTTALS (R)
Compared against other
products in the same
category and according
to current standards
for sustainability
Compliance with the
requirements of the
standards is verified
by an independent
third party
= certification
The party who is
verifying compliance
has been formally
recognized by an
authoritative body
= accreditation  
Figure 3.2 The label on a product is a claim that can be analysed in terms of arguments 
leading to a conclusion. 
 
In case the warrant is challenged, it can make an important difference 
whether and how the claim is regulated. To support the strength of arguments, 
therefore, the backing might be derived from knowledge about successful quality 
assurance systems. A strong case would imply that: 
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(1) the selected sustainability standards have been endorsed by one or 
more relevant and independent parties (i.e. recognition), 
(2) compliance with the accepted set of standards is verified by an 
independent third party (i.e. certification), and  
(3) the party who is verifying compliance has been formally recognized 
by an authoritative body (i.e. accreditation). 
This layout of arguments can be used to describe many different labels. The 
analysis of the layout can reveal which kinds of knowledge and value judgements are 
used to make a claim plausible. In addition, it can show how the initial warrants or 
backings are challenged and how the claim has to be qualified from a logical point of 
view. Some straightforward questions are what exactly is being claimed, by whom, 
and with what kind of warrants and backings? This requires a further analysis of 
sustainability to identify single issues in the form of "ideals" or "ills," and to assess 
how the single issues might be combined into a more comprehensive multi-issue 
label. In view of this, there appears to be a marked difference between environmental 
labels and social labels. The difference refers to the following. 
 Environmental labels, especially the multi-issue eco-labels, are often 
designed as a benchmark of excellence; the eco-label claims to disclose the top 5% to 
30% of the products in a certain category from the perspective of environmental 
performance. 
 Social labels are often designed to become the bottom-line in the 
market; the label claims to disclose those products or services that have at least been 
created in a socially acceptable manner. 
This difference in strategy has several implications. It means that 
sustainability labelling cannot simply replace the existing environmental and social 
labels, as there may be good reasons to keep these instruments. Whether it is relevant 
to disclose both environmental and social performance will depend, among other 
things, on the economic sector and the products or services in question. In addition, 
the companies involved may have their own strategic preferences. Depending on 
their position in the market and their ambitions, some companies may want to 
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disclose their top-ranking, whereas others may want to disclose their compliance 
with a proper bottom-line. 
An additional strategic point is the difference between multi-sector and 
sector-specific labels. Multi-sector labels, such as eco-labels, are intended to identify 
comparable levels of performance, regardless of the product category. It has been 
argued that multi-sector labels are suitable for product sectors where standards can 
be easily defined and where no controversial political issues exist. viii  For more 
complex products or products that avoid particular ills (e.g., canned tuna caught in a 
dolphin safe way), sector-specific labels have been developed that are tailor-made for 
the specific problem at hand. This means that there are at least four categories of 
labels, as specified in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Examples of labels in the various categories. 
 Label as a benchmark 
to achieve ideals 
Label as a bottom line 
to avoid ills 
Multi-sector labels EU eco-label Organic label 
Fair trade label 
Sector-specific labels Energy consumption label Dolphin Safe label 
No Sweat label 
Green electricity label 
 
The position of eco-labels as multi-sector labels meant to achieve "ideals" has 
been seriously criticised. For example, a major argument of business representativesix 
is the lack of accepted methodology to clearly distinguish individual products across 
an entire product category. Moreover, the label’s claim to identify an "ideal" has 
been challenged, because the standards involved are based on an evaluation of 
products as they exist in the marketplace today, and on publicly known technologies. 
Thus, the standards cannot anticipate what will develop tomorrow and, instead, can 
create barriers to innovation. This criticism seems to confirm Lindblom’s x 
observation that it is often harder to agree on the specification of "ideals" than of 
"ills." 
A final point for the present discussion is the question which conclusion can 
be drawn in the absence of a label. Whether the presence or absence of a label makes 
a difference will obviously depend on the degree to which environmental and social 
issues are part of the competition in the marketing of the products or services 
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involved. If these issues are part of the competition, the label's presence or absence 
can be highly diagnostic for a buyer. In other cases, however, the absence of a label 
will not be informative at all. It can mean that there are no significant sustainability-
related differences between the products or services in a certain category. It can also 
mean that producers have decided not to compete with each other on a sustainability 
issue to protect their industry's image and avoid additional costs.xi Hence, the logical 
analysis of a claim is one thing; it is another to find out how that claim is perceived 
by the actors in the marketplace, such as producers, retailers, purchasers and 
regulators. 
 
3.3 Functions for stakeholders 
3.3.1 What labelling means for sellers 
Based on literature on the behaviour of the main stakeholders, this Section 
discusses what labelling – as an economic instrument and as a political force – means 
for sellers, buyers, policymakers and other groups in society. We start off by 
examining the behaviour of companies. Labelling is one of the ways in which a 
company can attempt to improve its competitive position in the market and in its 
wider environment. The reasons to choose this option instead of others might be 
quite diverse, but they can always be translated into traditional business criteria, 
aimed at short-term and long-term profits. Notably, these criteria do not necessarily 
encourage strong competition. For any company there are circumstances in which it 
is more advantageous to opt for collaboration with other companies or organizations 
than to proceed on its own. This is particularly relevant for a company’s decision on 
labelling and certification, because these options will often imply both competitive 
and co-operative aspects. 
Before we turn to decisions on labelling, it is necessary to specify how a 
company might become interested in sustainability issues (i.e. ideals to approach or 
ills to escape). One obvious reason is that some companies were already free from 
certain ills, such as farming in a way that is heavily dependent on pesticides, because 
they did not wish to use this practice (e.g. organic farmers) or simply could not 
afford it (e.g. small farmers). Other reasons refer to the incentives that can stimulate 
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a company to improve its environmental and social performance. These incentives 
depend on various kinds of societal pressure, showing the interests of government 
agencies, shareholders, customers, business associations, environmental or social 
nongovernmental organizations, and the media.xii In varying degrees these actors 
have the ability to raise and to sustain pressure on certain companies and to turn 
environmental or social issues into economic ones that affect the companies’ 
profitability. Such pressures are not the same in all sectors and industries. Industries 
where environmental performance seems to play an important role in the public's 
perception include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, energy, construction, food and 
retail.xiii 
Companies that are in a position to claim voluntarily that their environmental 
and social performance is fully compatible with societal demands can do so in 
different ways. When this performance is achieved by all their business units and 
also by their business partners in the supply chain, they may adopt a "code of 
conduct" to articulate their commitments to particular principles and practices.xiv 
Other ways to disclose their position include the publication of corporate reports 
upon progress against sustainability principles, although it appears that the social 
dimension of reporting is still a new area.xv In the field of marketing, a company may 
invest in its brand or store name to make the relevant sustainability issues consistent 
with other signals that it is sending to its customers. When their sustainability 
performance only refers to certain products or services, companies may use more 
specific signals to bundle sustainability issues with product quality information and 
to gain attention from quality-sensitive customers. Such signals include quality 
assurance labels certified by the company itself (first-party), by industry-related 
associations or the country of origin (second-party), or by an independent third party. 
A company’s decision on sustainability labelling and certification will be 
governed by strategic and political circumstances, such as the ripeness of certain 
issues, at the time the options are contemplated. These circumstances, in turn, will 
generally depend on its own capabilities, its position in the industry in which it 
competes, the economic situation of this industry and the industry’s public image. 
Whether an issue is ripe will be influenced on the one hand by technological 
innovations related to sustainability ideals and on the other hand by public 
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campaigns that emphasize the ills of an industry. For example, in response to societal 
concern about the harvesting of certain natural resources, such as fish stocks and 
forests, several collective initiatives are under way to provide companies a market-
based incentive to maintain sustainable resources and to counter the common 
perception by the general public that most fisheries and forest practices do 
irreversible damage to the natural environment. xvi 
The latter example shows that a company's decision on labelling and 
certification might involve a mixture of competitive and collaborative strategies. 
Depending on its size, a company may have different reasons for a collaborative 
approach, but joint problem solving, cost savings and risk reductions will always be 
important. The development of a certification scheme means that the companies 
involved are prepared to share knowledge "from the kitchen" and want to learn about 
a particular activity, such as sustainable resource management.xvii 
A collaborative approach can be necessary to overcome barriers to the 
dissemination of credible information about sustainability issues. The assurance by a 
distinctive label, indicating collective membership of an organization or certification 
by an independent third party, may serve this purpose at lower costs than other 
marketing strategies that can differentiate a product. However, companies may also 
collectively decide not to compete with each other on a sustainability issue to protect 
their industry’s image and avoid additional costs. Accordingly, much will depend on 
the pressure of other actors who might emphasize the relevance of the issue.  
Closely connected to this latter consideration is the market form in which 
companies are operating. Section 3.4 takes a closer look at the interaction between 
market form and companies’ strategies with respect to labelling. 
 
3.3.2 What labelling means for buyers 
Labels belong to the cues that a buyer can use in the marketplace to learn 
about certain features of products, production processes or services. In the case of 
sustainability, the buyer can learn to differentiate between conventional products and 
products with distinctive environmental and moral advantages. Regarding the way 
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these cues are used, it is important to distinguish industrial markets from consumer 
markets. In industrial markets, customers have commercial incentives to invest in 
information about the differentiated products or services, as these might affect their 
own operations and costs to a very high degree. This businesslike approach to 
gathering information can also be expected of governments and large institutions 
seeking to incorporate sustainability considerations into their procurement processes. 
In contrast, the information needs of consumers are much less determined by a 
businesslike approach, as they are more sensitive to symbols and emotional appeals. 
Accordingly, this section focuses on consumer markets. 
Because consumers often have limited incentives to invest in information, the 
idea behind labelling seems to be very straightforward. A label is a distinctive 
symbol that reveals differences between more sustainable and less sustainable 
practices, which consumers might have been aware of but which they could not 
identify in the market. By enabling consumers to identify these differences, it is 
expected that they will become motivated to buy the labelled products instead of the 
others. This line of thought might be too simple, however. What happens in practice 
seems to be that consumers often say to be very concerned about sustainability 
issues, but that their actual purchases are something of a disappointment to many 
companies that have tried to create "green" market segments.xviii An obvious cause of 
this discrepancy is the level of the premium price that is often charged for the 
"green" product. A more general explanation might be that consumers and producers 
do not recognize or trust each other’s intentions and that they need more time to 
adapt themselves to the changing circumstances in the marketplace. It is usually 
assumed that the credibility of a company’s claim is enhanced if it is backed by an 
independent accredited third-party. Consumers’ trust in a label can also grow over 
time — if no evidence of cheating is discovered.xix 
Whether it is the premium price that can explain the behaviour of consumers 
or some other factor requires a closer look at their motives and lifestyles. There are 
large differences between consumers in the strength of their motivation to include 
pro-environmental or moral considerations into their purchasing decisions. xx  
Moreover, many consumers who make an ecologically or ethically motivated choice 
in the context of a certain product class may not do so in the context of another. The 
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following examples show that consumers are often dealing with mixed motives, 
which may or may not be consistent: 
 Consumers who buy foods produced in an ecologically sound manner 
may primarily be motivated by considerations related to their personal health, which 
happen to be consistent with ecological considerations.xxi 
 Consumers who are well aware of the ethical nature of purchase 
decisions may not change their buying pattern as long as that would be inconsistent 
with their loyalty to a particular taste, brand or supplier.xxii  
These examples indicate that consumers’ preferences cannot simply be read 
off their purchases in the market. At the moment of the purchase decision, the label’s 
impact will depend on how consumers understand, trust and value its claim in 
relation to other choice criteria. Teisl et al.xxiii note that environmentally-conscious 
consumers may even rank a green-labelled product lower, if they consider the green 
label incongruous with other signals, such as, for example, a low price. Consumers 
may consider the addition of the green label as an attempt to manipulate them, and 
therefore reject the product. Given the many hurdles that may hold consumers back 
from making a well-informed choice between more sustainable and less sustainable 
practices, it is presently emphasised in the marketing literature that the companies 
involved should pay more attention to the question what kind of green product 
consumers really want.xxivIf the only merits of a green product seem to be that it is 
considered preferable from an environmental or moral point of view, many 
consumers might not be fully convinced that they should search for that product and 
pay a price premium for it. In order to create more value for these consumers, both 
the design and the marketing of a product should be addressed to all the product 
attributes that they consider relevant, such as functional and esthetical features, 
together with distinctive environmental and moral advantages. Depending on the 
product category (e.g., luxuries or necessities) and the market segment the product is 
aimed at, this strategy might imply that the product’s environmental and moral 
advantage is presented as one of its self-evident qualities rather than as its main 
selling-point. 
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As a result of these new marketing strategies, it can be expected that the role 
of environmental and social labels in the communication between consumers and 
companies will become more differentiated, varying from direct shopping aids to 
background quality assurances. The present marketing strategies may also involve 
that the information the labelling is intended to convey to consumers will 
increasingly refer to the overall corporate image of a store chain or a line of products 
(e.g., the private label of the Body Shop). In that case, a retailer or producer can 
claim the distinctive environmental and moral advantage with regard to an 
assortment of products. This development might increase the probability that 
consumers come into contact with a labelled product and that they include it in their 
set of choice alternatives. 
A well-designed marketing strategy can create many opportunities for 
consumers to learn how to recognize a label and evaluate the meaning of its claim. 
This learning process may also increase consumers’ awareness of sustainability 
issues in general, even if they don’t use the label as a direct shopping aid. Such an 
additional role of labelling policies is often overlooked. xxv  However, consumer 
learning is not a smoothly running processxxvi and it might also be slowed by possible 
gaps between producers’ and consumers’ understanding of what "sustainability" 
means. As mentioned in Chapter 2, such a gap might hamper the understanding of 
sustainability labelling. 
To return to an earlier point, it has to be noted that consumers should not only 
trust the difference between labelled and unlabelled products, but also the reasons for 
a price premium. As a result of the bad reputation of the "green" claims in the early 
1990s, many consumers have become very sceptical about the behaviour of 
companies. xxvii  This scepticism adds another motive to consumers’ purchasing 
decisions. Those consumers, in particular, who are highly motivated to include pro-
environmental or moral considerations into their purchasing decisions may also be 
highly motivated to scrutinize the claims and the premium prices of labelled 
products. 
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3.3.3 What labelling means for policymakers 
Supporting or regulating labelling schemes are tools that policymakers have 
at their disposal to address some important aspects of two policy issues. The first 
issue is mainly concerned with the economic interests of consumers and comes down 
to correcting for asymmetries in information, where sellers have more information 
than buyers about product qualities. An important aspect of this issue is protection of 
consumers against any substantial risks associated with a product or service usage, 
for example through warning labels, and prevention of misleading advertising or 
deceptive environmental claims. The second issue refers to government policies to 
achieve sustainability objectives, particularly by promoting the design and marketing 
of environmentally sound products or services. From the perspective of a 
policymaker, labelling and certification schemes can be seen as tools that create 
incentives for business to change the market in a more sustainable direction. 
With regard to these wide-ranging policy issues, labelling and certification 
schemes typically address those aspects that are related to the disclosure of 
information about products, production methods or services. Clearly, any 
intervention in the information environment for products or services may have far-
reaching consequences in the marketplace, especially if the information refers to 
culturally "sensitive" issues, such as health and moral concerns. Well-known 
government interventions include establishing mandatory labelling laws (e.g., to 
enforce the disclosure of a disadvantage), regulating claims through legal definitions 
of specific terms (e.g., "organic"), and providing services to support voluntary 
labelling (e.g., financing public education). Additionally, governments may 
incorporate sustainability considerations into public procurement by linking the 
terms of purchase to labelling and certification schemes. These interventions can 
often be conceived as complements to or substitutes for other tools, such as the 
banning of hazardous products. 
Whether and in which form labelling is an appropriate policy tool for the 
specific issue involved will, among other things, depend on the regulatory context 
and its matching socio-cultural tradition. For example, a strong legal and cultural 
emphasis on consumer right to know combined with consumer responsibility to use 
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the information properly, such as in the United States,xxviii makes labelling a policy 
tool that is highly compatible with the values and practices of all parties concerned. 
Given the strategic role of information in this context, however, potential 
government interventions may become hotly contested, as they leave much room for 
legal disputes over the description of claims and appropriate disclaimers. xxix 
Observers have noted that labelling may often represent a short-term solution to a 
difficult regulatory problem.xxx If there are diverging opinions on the appropriate 
regulatory response to an issue, labelling can become a compromise that is 
particularly attractive to policymakers because of its market-based character. In the 
long term, labelling can become one of the first steps in a government strategy of 
gradually increasing pressure on producers and consumers to steer their behaviour in 
a particular direction (e.g., voluntary labelling as a precursor to mandatory labelling). 
Although purely information-based policies will usually be insufficient to achieve 
societal "ideals" or avoid societal "ills," they may effectively prepare the ground for 
more far-reaching measures. 
A final consideration for policymakers in evaluating interventions in labelling 
refers to potential conflicts between the national right to regulate and international 
trade-related rules. This point will not be discussed here, because it requires a closer 
consideration of international institutions. Despite the differences between countries 
in the way they are dealing with the issues of consumer protection and sustainability, 
however, there are common attempts to improve the transparency of quality 
assurances and the substantiation of socially relevant claims, whether they are 
directly product-related, such as health claims for foods, or not, such as ethical 
claims.xxxi One of the reasons of this might be that labelling can only keep its status 
as a market-based policy tool, if policymakers are able to adapt government 
interventions to the developments in the market and these may require both 
standardisation and differentiation of quality assurances and claims. 
 
3.3.4 What labelling means for other groups 
Supporting or criticising labelling schemes are tools that environmental or 
social NGOs can use to put pressure on producers and consumers to make progress 
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towards sustainability. This potential function of labelling for third parties has been 
highlighted by the economist Julie Caswell, xxxii  who argues that the analysis of 
labelling policies should not be restricted to their role as a direct aid to consumers in 
making purchase decisions. For example, a labelling initiative may stimulate public 
discussion and crystallise a set of judgements on the environmentally or morally 
relevant qualities of a product, production method or service. The discussion on these 
judgements might provide guidelines for appropriate actions by producers, retailers, 
consumers and other groups. A labelling initiative may also create new relationships 
between companies and NGOs in the development of standards for practices that are 
sufficiently more sustainable than the conventional ones.xxxiii This can be particularly 
important in view of the possible gap between sustainability issues as conceived by 
large companies and those perceived by other groups. 
The role of critics of conventional practices is most fundamentally performed 
by those NGOs who act in a tradition of opposition to the domination of society by 
consumerism. Consumerism has always provoked opposition, inspired by various 
moral, esthetical and political themes.xxxiv Although the rather heterogeneous nature 
of this opposition should not be underestimated, its key themes have much in 
common with the concept of sustainability. This means that a variety of protest 
groups and more established NGOs may put pressure on companies and 
governments, for example by public campaigns or court actions to disseminate 
information about the environmental and social consequences of consumption. As far 
as their criticism is based on opposition to consumerism, it is not likely that they will 
support a labelling initiative to promote sustainable consumption without also 
promoting other themes, such as consuming less, consuming second hand products or 
consuming products for a longer time. These themes of what is sometimes called 
"voluntary simplicity" are, by their very nature, not designed to fit into the marketing 
strategies of large companies, but they may be compatible with the patronage of 
alternative "ethical" products.xxxv A more radical point of view, noted by Peattie,xxxvi 
is that labelling will do too little to transform the environmental or social impacts of 
entire markets and that it should be denounced as potentially counterproductive. In 
contrast, groups that are closer to the mainstream, such as many consumer 
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organisations, show a broad support for labelling as a tool for sustainable 
consumption, provided that spurious and misleading claims are eliminated.xxxvii 
 
3.4 Market strategies of companies  
3.4.1 The economics of information 
This section takes a closer look at the interaction between companies’ 
strategies with respect to labelling, market form, and outcomes of the interactions 
among market participants. As was said earlier, labels have the specific purpose of 
signalling some attribute of the product or service to the buyer, that he or she might 
value but cannot directly observe before purchasing it, and, in the case of 
environmental or social attributes, cannot even be observed after the sale has been 
made. Based on insights derived from the economics of information,xxxviii this section 
examines how disclosure of information through labelling can lead to various market 
strategies and interactions among market participants, which may not always lead to 
the desired outcome in terms of the objective of the label. Crucial in this respect is 
that a label splits the market of a product in two market segments: a labelled segment 
and an unlabelled one. To examine the overall effects of a sustainability label, its 
effects in both market segments should be examined.    
The effect of asymmetric information on market performance was first 
explicitly addressed by Akerlofxxxix who used the example of the second-hand car 
market to illustrate his ideas. It is well known that in his example the market 
collapses. Because of the asymmetrical information between buyer and seller about 
the quality of the second-hand cars, there is adverse selection implying that the 
uninformed side of the market (the buyer in this example), is not offered the quality 
he would like to purchase and would be prepared to pay for. It would be beneficial to 
both buyer and seller of high-quality goods if sellers could signal the quality of their 
goods to potential buyers. To be credible, however, sellers of low-quality goods 
should not be able to copy the signal. If products and services with certain 
sustainability attributes are in demand but also costlier to produce than products and 
services without these attributes, a lack of credible signals could make the market for 
sustainable goods collapse, just as the market for second-hand cars collapsed in the 
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example of Akerlof. What, then, are good signals? A seller of sustainably-produced 
products and services can have various options at his disposal, including, for 
example, brand-name reputation, advertising, high prices, introductory low prices,xl 
and also codes of conduct and adopting sustainability label. A supplier must always 
make a trade-off between the effectiveness of a certain signalling strategy and its 
costs.xli 
What are the main ingredients of a company’s strategy on sustainability 
labelling? The company has to decide whether or not to apply for a sustainability 
label for one or more of its products and/or services. Once it has adopted such a label 
it has to decide whether to comply with the rules set out by the labelling organisation 
(which we take to be a third party), or not. The working hypothesis in economics is 
that a company’s aim is to maximise its profits. Although it cannot be denied that 
some companies also pursue other objectives, such as environmental and social ones, 
in a competitive environment no company can neglect concern for its profitability 
and hope to be in business for a long time. Therefore, we assume that profit 
maximisation behaviour is a fairly accurate description of the behaviour of the 
overwhelming majority of companies in market economies. 
 
3.4.2 Market forms 
Given profit maximisation, what is the rational behaviour of companies with 
respect to sustainability labelling? An important determinant of that behaviour is the 
market form in which the company operates. A broad classification of market forms 
is monopoly (no competition), oligopoly (competition among a small number of 
companies), and perfect competition (competition among a large number of 
companies without market power, i.e., without the ability to influence market 
variables, such as prices, through their own actions). While the analytics of profit-
maximising company behaviour under monopoly and perfect competition are clear 
and unambiguous, those under oligopoly are generally not, because companies can 
compete with each other in a variety of ways, and the nature of competition is crucial 
for the market outcomes. We will return to this issue later. 
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Kirchhoffxlii examines optimal behaviour for a monopolistic company. Her 
research problem is the question as to why some many companies in today’s world 
are actually overcomplying with legal environmental standards and why they are 
sometimes actively lobbying for third-party labelling or environmental auditing 
programmes. To answer this question, she develops a model for one monopolistic 
company that produces only one product. For simplicity’s sake, the company is 
assumed to exist for only two time periods. The company’s problem is whether or 
not to apply for an eco-label for its product, and whether or not to comply with the 
rules of the eco-label organisation (whether or not to be "honest"). It is assumed that 
a third party monitors compliance, but that the monitoring is not perfect, i.e. the 
probability of being detected in case of cheating is less than one. 
There is effective consumer demand for the environmentally-superior variety 
of the company’s product. As was already discussed in Section 3.3.2, the consumer’s 
willingness-to-pay is a function of its belief that the environmental claim of the 
company is honest. This belief can change over time, i.e. increase if the company’s 
claim is not found to be untrue.  
Given this consumer demand, the company chooses its strategy as to 
maximise its discounted profit over two time periods. In this simple model, the 
strategies that include the adoption of an eco-label are always dominant over the 
strategies of not adopting an eco-label. The maximum penalty of cheating is that 
consumers pay the same price in the second period that they would have paid if the 
company had not adopted an eco-label at all. The question then is: will the company 
cheat or not? Kirchhoff derives from her model the conditions under which the 
company will comply and thus will adopt environmentally-friendly production 
methods. These conditions are more likely to be met if: 
 The premium of the environmentally-superior product is relatively 
large; 
 The cost increase due to the environmentally-friendly production 
method is relatively small, and smaller than the environmental premium; 
 The probability of being monitored is high; 
Chapter 3 
 48
 The discount rate is low; and 
 Consumers believe that the probability that the company is honest is 
high. 
Hence, to the extent that third-party labelling increases the chance of the 
company being monitored and strengthens initial consumer beliefs that the company 
is honest, it is more likely that the company will actually adopt environmentally-
friendly production methods. Moreover, Kirchhoff shows that if the company 
chooses environmentally-friendly production methods, its profits increase with 
stricter monitoring and higher consumer confidence. This can explain the observation 
that companies in the USA and Europe are sometimes actively lobbying for third-
party labelling schemes and stricter labelling rules.  
In the analysis of Kirchhoff, the company only produces one product. The 
adoption of an eco-label for this product and compliance to its rules, unambiguously 
improve environmental quality. In contrast, Dosi & Morettoxliii  argue that things 
might be more complicated if the company engaged more product lines, of which 
only one would acquire an eco-label. They argue that if the eco-label for this one 
product would somehow project a positive image over the entire company, and hence 
also increase the profitability of the non-labelled products, the eco-label might 
actually give an incentive to expand investments in the non-labelled product lines 
too. The overall environmental effect of the eco-label would then be ambiguous. The 
empirical relevance of this result is not entirely clear, however. Dosi & Moretto point 
to legislation on misleading advertising that allows companies only to use eco-labels 
in advertisements “in relation to the specific product for which it was awarded”xliv 
but they do not provide empirical examples. 
 
3.4.3 Competition 
How does competition affect the results? In a much-cited article, Mattoo & 
Singhxlv develop a simple model of eco-labelling in a perfectly competitive market. 
In their model, that assumes away some of the complexities of Kirchhoff,xlvi an eco-
label segments the market of a product into a market for labelled products and one 
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for unlabelled products. There are two kinds of consumers, one group – the 
“greens”–that only buys the labelled products and one group – the “browns”– that 
only buys the cheapest products, whether they be labelled or not. Given the 
willingness to pay of the “greens”, the relative price of the labelled products will be 
higher, the smaller the supply of labelled products, i.e. the stricter the eco-labelling 
criteria. For the unlabelled market segment, the price will also be higher, the smaller 
the supply, i.e., the laxer the eco-labelling criteria (so that a larger proportion of the 
product will be labelled as “green”). Relaxing eco-labelling criteria will therefore 
result in falling prices of labelled products and rising prices of non-labelled products. 
At some level of criteria, prices will equate. Assume that this will happen before all 
products are labelled and note that unlabelled products can never become more 
expensive than labelled products, because “browns” would then buy so many 
labelled products that price equality would be restored again.xlvii  
At this level of criteria, prices in both markets would be the same. However, 
because of the fact that the eco-label effectively skimmed the willingness to pay of 
the “green” consumers, the after-eco-label price must be higher than the before-eco-
label price. Hence, under the assumption that supply is a continuous, monotonically 
increasing function of price, producers of unlabelled products also get an incentive to 
increase supply relative to the situation without labelling.  
While this is a theoretical result, Mattoo & Singhxlviii argue that it is not 
implausible. As examples they give the dolphin-friendly label on tuna sold in the 
USA and labels for sustainably-produced timber. In the case of tuna, they suggest 
that prior to the labelling requirement, about 80 per cent of tuna supplied to the U.S. 
market could qualify as “dolphin-friendly”, while effective demand for “dolphin-
friendly” tuna would be much less. They argue that had it not been for the U.S. 
embargo on the importation of tuna caught in a dolphin-unfriendly manner that 
coincided with the labelling requirement, the market price of tuna and the supply of 
tuna caught by dolphin-friendly methods as well as by dolphin-unfriendly methods 
would have increased.xlix The market for timber would show similar characteristics 
and hence an eco-label could produce perverse results in this case too. 
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While Mattoo & Singh analyse market structure effects of eco-labels, they do 
not address the problem of asymmetric information. Kuhnl extends their analysis by 
including this aspect into his model. Rational consumers in his model forecast the 
ratio of “green” to “brown” products in a particular market correctly. In the case of 
eco-labelling, consumers form beliefs over the probability that a label’s claim is 
correct. Producers of “green” and “brown” product variants can both apply for an 
eco-label, but it assumed that on average it is more costly for a producer of a 
“brown” product variant to acquire the label, because he has to invest resources to 
manipulate the auditing outcome. Assuming also that “brown” producers have a cost 
advantage over “green” producers, Kuhnli formally establishes the conditions under 
which “green” producers will enter the market, and what the effects are of a small 
change in the eco-label’s criteria. He thus finds the theoretical conditions under 
which eco-labels perform well, i.e., increase “green” supply and reduce “brown” 
supply, and conditions under which eco-labels can create perverse effects, as in 
Mattoo & Singh.lii  
 
3.4.4 Oligopoly 
Oligopoly is the most complex market form. Analytical results with general 
validity are hard to derive, because of the many types of competition that are 
possible. Nadai & Morelliii examine the effects of an eco-labelling programme on 
competition and the environment in an industry with a limited number of 
interdependent companies that compete through manipulating their supplies (a 
strategy that is called Cournot competition). They also examine the companys’ 
optimal strategies in negotiating the eco-label’s criteria with the eco-labelling 
organisation. The theoretical analysis is derived from case studies on the 
development of EU’s eco-label on several product categories.liv The papers of Nadai 
and Morel focus, respectively, on an industry in which each company supplies an 
identical range of products or product variants, ranging from environmentally-
friendly (“green”) products, to products with less favourable environmental 
characteristics (“brown”), and on an industry where each company only supplies one 
product or product variant, that may be either “green” or “brown”, depending on the 
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eco-label-criteria chosen. Nadai and Morel call the multi-product industry, which 
resembles the indoor paints and varnishes industry, a homogeneous industry, while 
they call the mono-product industry, e.g. the detergent industry, heterogeneous. The 
effect of eco-labelling on heterogeneous and homogeneous industries is different, 
and their respective negotiation strategies also differ. 
In a homogeneous industry, where each company produces “green” as well as 
“brown” product variants, all companies can potentially benefit from an eco-label, if 
there is effective demand for the “green” product quality. Therefore, it is relatively 
easy for a labelling organisation to develop an eco-label in a homogeneous industry, 
e.g. the indoor paints and varnishes industry. In contrast, in a heterogeneous industry 
there is no natural coalition of companies with whom to negotiate labelling criteria. 
At any criterion (from very stringent to very lenient), profits in the green sector 
exceed those in the brown sector, the more so, the less innovation takes place. 
Formally, any company will maximise its profit at that criterion at which its product 
would just qualify for the eco-label. Because of the fact that it is assumed that all 
companies have a different environmental "profile", every company has its own 
optimal criterion. Nadai & Morellv suggest that this heterogeneity among companies 
is the principal reason why the development of a EU eco-label blocked for several 
product groups, for example, detergents, paper products, hairsprays, and batteries.  
Two more results on the homogeneous industries are worth mentioning. First, 
from the perspective of the companies there are two profit-maximising equilibriums 
for eco-label criteria: very strict and very lax. A very strict standard maximizes 
profits in the “green” market segment; a very lax standard (so lax that there will be 
no price difference between “green” and “brown” varieties) maximizes profits in the 
“brown” market segment. Which equilibrium is preferred depends on the effective 
demand for “green” products: if this is high the strict equilibrium is preferred, if it is 
low the lax equilibrium will be preferred. However, because all companies benefit 
from the eco-label, there is scope for the labelling organisation to negotiate criteria 
that are sub-optimal for the companies, but are better for the environment.lvi 
Second, the amount of environmental innovation to the eco-label depends on 
the ratio of innovation costs to production costs and “green” demand. If innovation 
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costs are very small and “green” demand is high, strict eco-label criteria may induce 
environmental innovation that “pull” products into the green market segment. 
However, more lenient criteria may also induce innovation, as the homogeneous 
companies innovate “brown” products for the purpose of “pushing” them out of the 
“brown” market segment, in order to reduce supply and maximize profits in this 
market segment. 
Even under the restriction of Cournot competition, Nadai & Morellvii show 
that many possible outcomes on total market size, green market share, innovation 
and competition are possible under oligopoly in a heterogeneous industry, depending 
on parameter values of, e.g., eco-label strictness, green demand (both the share of 
green consumers and their willingness to pay) and innovation costs. For example, 
total market volume of the product may increase, decrease or remain unchanged after 
the eco-label. While profits of eco-labelling companies always increase after an eco-
label, profits of non-labelling companies may actually decrease after an eco-label, 
especially if innovation costs are high and the ratio of green consumers is high, such 
that non-labelling companies are “locked-in” in an unattractive and declining brown 
market segment. If such a situation is likely to occur, fierce opposition of these 
companies to an eco-labelling scheme can be expected.  
Companies that can obtain the label relatively easily, are likely to see their 
profits increase and could be expected to lobby for a sustainability label. Companies 
can also view the label as a device to restrict competition and as a barrier to future 
entry into the industry, and also as a device to pre-empt future mandatory regulation 
by the government.lviii  
An overall conclusion would be that in the case of oligopoly, few general 
predictions can be made on the economic effects of eco-labelling. Especially in a 
market with interdependent companies, the effects of eco-labelling will be highly 
dependent on the nature of competition and on various relevant parameter values, 
including those of demand and innovation costs.  
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3.4.5 Inputs with alternative uses outside of the targeted industry 
The economic analysis so far was restricted to the effects of eco-labelling on 
single industries. While this partial equilibrium approach may well be justified for 
those labels that focus mainly on emissions of pollutants that are by-products of 
production processes in some industry and do not have significant impacts on other 
markets, it may not always be appropriate if the label focuses on inputs such as 
labour or natural resources that may have alternative uses outside of the targeted 
industry. Examples are labels that focus on forestry products and labels that focus on 
child labour. The appropriate approach in those cases in which inter-industry 
linkages are potentially important is general equilibrium analysis that takes on an 
economy-wide perspective.  
One are of labelling where such inter-industry effects might occur is the 
labelling of sustainable wood. Swallow & Sedjo lix   argue that labelling and 
certification of sustainable wood could, under certain circumstances, lead to 
deleterious effects on non-certified forests and idle lands that might partly or totally 
undo the positive effects on certified forests. The general equilibrium mechanism is 
as follows. Assume an economy that produces two goods: wood (W) and other goods 
(Y). Certification and labelling of all W, increases the price of W and decreases 
demand for W by brown consumers and may increase or decrease demand for W by 
green consumers. Brown consumers shift their demand to Y, and green consumers 
may or may not shift their demand to Y (depending on their ratio of willingness to 
pay for certified wood and the market price increase due to certification and 
labelling). Assume that, on balance, there is a shift in demand towards Y. Then the 
marginal product of land in W production declines and the marginal product of land 
in Y production increases. Therefore, eco-labelling might cause the economy to 
reallocate land from forestry, or from hitherto “idle” lands, to the production of other 
goods, e.g., agricultural products. To assess the final ecological impact of the eco-
label, the benefits of the improved ecological quality of the land under certified 
forestry should be weighed against the potential costs due to the reallocation of 
formerly forested or idle lands to other uses.  
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Labelling schemes that might have a significant impact on labour can also 
have inter-industry effects. An example is a label that guarantees that a product has 
not been made by child labour. Brownlx argues that in the case of child labour labels, 
the underlying motivation of consumers concerns the children’s quality of life, rather 
than just the assurance that a particular product is not produced by children. A 
labelling programme that just eliminates or reduces the supply of products made by 
children cannot guarantee that the former child worker is now better off. It is indeed 
a common practice of labelling organisations in this area to devote some portion of 
the licensing fee to contribute to child welfare programs. In this case, Brownlxi 
argues, it is not enough to examine the impacts of the labelling scheme on the 
specific industry concerned, but there is a need for a general equilibrium analysis that 
sheds light on the economy-wide effects on child labour participation, their wage 
rates, and their overall welfare. 
How could a labelling programme improve the welfare of children? In 
principle there are two ways. The first way is that the premium paid by consumers 
for adult-produced products is so large that adult wages rise above a threshold above 
which families choose not to let their children work. Research has indeed found an 
inverse correlation between per capital GDP and labour force participation by 
children.lxii The second way is that the licensing fee is so large that sufficient funds 
can be raised to support displaced child workers.  
Brown lxiii  develops a two-sector general equilibrium model for a small 
economy. Sector X is the export sector, and sector M the import-competing sector. 
Both sectors use child and adult labour in different proportions.  A labelling scheme 
is installed for the X sector. Two distinguishing variables in Brown’s model are the 
labelling premium offered by consumers and the adequacy of monitoring.  
1. With perfect (and costless) monitoring and a labelling premium just 
sufficient to compensate the X-industry for employing only adults, the factor rewards 
(wages) of adult and child labour will not change and hence overall labour force 
participation of children will not change. Moreover, the child welfare fund will be 
approximately empty.  
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2. With perfect (and costless) monitoring and a labelling premium that 
exceeds the minimum amount of 1), then there is money for the welfare fund and 
children may be better off. However, as some part of the premium compensates for 
the higher costs of adult labour in the X-sector, children would be even better off if 
consumers would pay a premium that is not contingent upon child labour-free 
imports. An alternative is that no license fee is raised. In that case profits in the X-
industry would rise, bidding up the cost of adult labour. Wages of adults would rise 
and wages of children would fall, and therefore, if the premium is high enough, 
possibly inducing families to withdraw their children from the workforce, especially 
since the opportunity costs of not letting the children work (their foregone wages) 
have dropped. 
3. In the case of imperfect monitoring and a relatively low labelling 
premium, there is no labelling equilibrium. The relatively low premium is just 
enough to compensate firms for employing adults only. The premium is not high 
enough to finance a license fee. Without a license fee cheating would not push profits 
of cheating firms below zero, hence all firms will cheat.  
4. In the case of imperfect monitoring and a relatively high labelling 
premium, then a labelling equilibrium as in case 1) can be established or when the 
premium is even higher, results of case 2) can be established.  
The conclusions of Brown are rather pessimistic. To have any effect, the 
labelling premium offered by consumers must be relatively high; revenues must 
exceed the adjustment costs of the affected industry. If these revenues are used for a 
children welfare fund, children may be better off, but their labour participation rate 
will be unaffected. Children would be even better off if consumers would pay an 
equivalent sum of money directly to the welfare fund, instead of through the 
roundabout route of paying extra for child-labour free products, for example, 
footballs or hand-knotted carpets. If the revenues are returned to the sector, the faith 
of the child workers is very uncertain. The short-term effect is that their wages go 
down, and that would affect their welfare negatively. Whether adult wages rise 
sufficiently for families to choose to withdraw their children from the working force 
is very uncertain. Imperfect monitoring reduces the chances of beneficial effects. 
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3.5 Implications  
Taken together, the evidence in the preceding sections underlines the special 
status of sustainability labelling. The claim that a certain product or service has an 
advantage over a conventional one from the perspective of sustainability is more than 
just a marketing tool. It refers to ills that can be avoided or ideals that can be 
achieved in relation to the present production and consumption patterns. By its 
nature, it is closely connected with the political force that is generated by all kinds of 
actors in society to change these patterns in a more sustainable direction. Because 
this pressure is not the same in all sectors and industries, it is not feasible to draw 
generalising conclusions on the effectiveness of labelling and certification schemes. 
What labelling may produce, at the very least, is that it helps to learn more about the 
arguments used to substantiate or to challenge a claim. This learning process requires 
a transparent organisation of labelling schemes with enough opportunities for 
stakeholders to participate in the design of sustainability standards. 
A more effective change might be produced through the interaction between 
societal pressure and market forces. Many companies will need improved control 
over all the relevant aspects of product quality, including the way the product has 
been produced. This will often require more functional co-ordination of widely 
dispersed activities and more disclosure of information across the whole supply 
chain. Improved control is particularly necessary for those companies that want to 
supply to increasingly discriminating (niche) markets. Sustainability issues may be 
incorporated into their quality management and quality assurance programmes, but 
that will depend on the ripeness of the issue involved (i.e. innovations and "hot 
topics"). Moreover, a company’s strategy to improve its sustainability performance 
may show a mixture of competitive and collaborative approaches. Whether it will 
disclose its sustainability performance by a distinctive label or by some other means 
is a matter of benefits and costs in view of its marketing opportunities. 
Producers and consumers are still learning how to communicate about 
sustainability issues in the context of the marketplace. Actually, both of them have to 
cope with mixed motives, which include other considerations than the environmental 
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and moral advantage of a product. Consumers can learn, but this takes time and also 
positive experiences instead of lingering doubts about deceptive commercial 
practices. Similarly, in order to pursue the diffusion of ecologically or ethically 
sound products from small niche markets to mass markets producers will need time 
to find out what kind of "green and good" products consumers really want.  
As a result of new marketing strategies, it can be expected that the role of 
environmental and social labels in the communication between companies and 
consumers will become more differentiated, varying from direct shopping aids to 
background quality assurances. The new strategies may also involve that the 
information the labelling is intended to convey to consumers will increasingly refer 
to the overall corporate image of a store chain or a line of products. In that case, a 
retailer or producer can claim the distinctive environmental and moral advantage 
with regard to an assortment of products. This development might increase the 
probability that consumers come into contact with a labelled product and that they 
include it in their set of choice alternatives. 
The potential change in the information environment for products and 
services may give rise to additional questions about whether and how claims should 
be regulated. Government interventions in labelling will often be a complement to or 
a substitute for other policy tools to improve consumer protection or to achieve 
sustainability objectives. The links with other tools and broader issues have 
important consequences for the design and the evaluation of an intervention, because 
labelling will be insufficient to achieve these goals if it is merely an isolated action. 
Moreover, if policymakers want to optimise the design of this tool, they should adapt 
the intervention carefully to the developments in the market and these may require 
both standardisation and differentiation of claims 
Finally, it is important to distinguish the role of labelling as a political force 
from its role as an economic instrument. It has been shown that disclosure of 
information through labelling can lead to various market strategies and interactions 
among market participants that may not always lead to the desired outcome in terms 
of the objective of the label. The point is that one should not only look at what 
happens to the labelled market segment, but also to the unlabelled one. Therefore, it 
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is essential to examine the market conditions under which sustainability labels can be 
successful (i.e., increase "green" supply and reduce "brown" supply) or can lead to 
unwanted or "perverse" effects. 
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